

Turning Against Neighbours: The Fortification of the United Kingdom in Representations of Internalised Movements by Non-UK EU Citizens During the Early Twenty-First Century

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Abstract

This article challenges the static polarisations between open externalised and closed internalised societies found in liberal paradox models, and shifts to more active understandings of socio-psychological fortification processes. It investigates the remarks of Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom (UK) during the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, in particular their representations of internalised movements by non-UK European Union (EU) citizens into the UK. The study illustrates that, even as a member of the EU, UK leaders blurred the distinctions between the rights-based movement of EU citizens, and permission-based non-EU movements of people. The movement of EU citizens into the UK was stigmatised with broader fears about the scarcity of societal health and welfare resources. This was in concert with the propagation of more collective-nationalist normative attachments. UK leaders contributed to the ongoing fortification of UK society in opposition to the EU as a whole.

Keywords

representation; fortification; EU; UK; stigmatisation.

Introduction

One way to conceptualise the contradictory tensions around the mass migration experienced by liberal democratic societies has been via the notion of a 'liberal paradox'. James Hollifield (2004: 886) remarks that

States are trapped in a 'liberal' paradox – in order to maintain a competitive advantage, governments must keep their economies and societies open to trade, investment, and migration. But unlike goods, capital, and services, the movement of people involves greater political risks.

There is a juxtaposition between the logic of transnational economics that emphasises openness, and the logic of domestic politics that stresses closure, expressing misgivings towards transnational migration (Hollifield 1992; 2004: 887; McNevin 2007: 626; Hampshire 2013: 12; Goodman and Schimmelfennig 2020: 1107–1110). The notion of a paradox is itself problematic in two ways. Firstly, it assumes a static set of societal relations in which political deliberations are separated from economic considerations, leading to the sphere of economics becoming de-politicised in ways that dismiss the ways in which the overlap language, representation, and power relations contributes to the maintenance and (possible) expansion of these tensions. Secondly, in contrast to comments made by Goodman and Schimmelfennig (2020: 1107), the conceptual separation of external economics and internal domestic politics is unsustainable in the context of the European Union (EU). Over time, the EU has developed multi-layered degrees of both state-societal and economic integration, as well as mixed nationalised and EU institutionalised identifications (Adler-Nissen 2009; Ruhs and Palme 2018). The liberal paradox advanced by Goodman and Schimmelfennig (2020: 1106) that builds on the definition by Hollifield also equates 'identity' with 'politics' in the context of mass migration, treating identity as an unchanging concept without a grasp of how identifications can and have changed.

The question of how liberal-democratic societies have managed the interdependencies that bind the movement of people, capital, goods and services forms one of the core features of ongoing integration

processes within the EU. It is a question that underpins the historical, political, and social thinking processes reflected in the Treaty of Lisbon (see Official Journal of the European Union 2007). In Ireland, the movement of EU citizens forms the majority of non-Irish transnational movement, and among this group, nationals from the 2004 group of EU accession states (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) were mostly concentrated within lower pay occupations in construction, retail, and hospitality (Loyal 2011: 189–190). Garapich (2008: 748) notes that the expansion of freedom of movement within the EU remodelled understandings of EU citizenship in ways that empowered greater social and political participation practiced by Polish workers in the United Kingdom (UK). Rommel (2017: 143, 149) highlights how differing attitudes towards the 2015 refugee crisis across sections of German society were linked to certain understandings of EU integration. There was the galvanisation of both right-wing re-nationalisation movements in opposition to EU integration, and civic societal movements that favoured combinations of global welcome-culture and/or the EU itself as the emphasis of identification. These same tensions are observable in the 2018 New Year Address by German Chancellor Angela Merkel (2017), who spoke about Germany as an economically prosperous cosmopolitan society with a willingness to assist others, including refugees, as well as concerns about how immigration is managed. In this same speech, Merkel also spoke about the need for both internal and external EU solidarity, which meant being ‘economically successful and equitable [...] as well as consistently standing up for the protection of our external borders and the security of our citizens’.

In contrast to the exceptionalist and exclusivist juxtapositions in the conceptualisation of a liberal paradox, this article introduces an active conceptualisation that investigates how people fortify and/or defortify their relations, incorporating understandings of language, interdependence and power relations developed in the sociologies of Norbert Elias and Ulrich Beck. [1],[2].The process sociology of Elias emphasises ‘the manifold ways in which people are bounded to each other, in co-operation as well as conflict’ (Goudsblom 1987: 330). In parallel, Beck (1992: 55) stresses the interdependence of human lifestyles and knowledge development through blends of subject perception and object knowledge of invisible side effects or risks. Understanding the degrees of fortification–defortification reorientates the focus of research towards a grasp of how often contradictory sociological and psychological tensions maintain, extend or even reduce the barriers between people. This more open conceptualisation is used to investigate the representations of movements by non-UK EU citizens articulated by United UK prime ministers from the beginning of the 2000s to the eve of the 2016 EU Referendum. Over the course of this period, UK Prime Ministers Tony Blair (1997–2007), Gordon Brown (2007–2010) and David Cameron (2010–2016) propagated more fortified modes of societal orientation that stigmatised the movement of non-UK EU citizens into the UK. They also narrowed the scope of socio-emotive association and widened forms of disassociation between the UK and the wider EU.

This is a marked contrast to statements made by their predecessors John Major (1990–1997) and especially Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990). The latter reaffirmed her commitment to the Treaty of Rome, a ‘Treaty based on free and fair competition in trade; on the free movement of people, goods and capital across traditional frontiers’. Even in her infamous 1988 Bruges Speech, in which she stated that ‘Europe is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome’, she still endorsed the lowering of frontiers to ‘make it easier for people to travel throughout the Community’. Thatcher (1988) herself made the distinction (similar to Merkel 2017 above) between the more harmless internalised movement of EU citizens (presumably this includes both UK citizens and non-UK EU citizens), and the need to ‘to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants’. She also propagated a sensitisation to the presence of harmful sections of UK society that sought to deceive government authorities. ‘If there is fraud of any kind, either in connection with social security or tax, there are people allocated to root it out, after which it becomes a matter for the police’ (Thatcher 1982).

Under Thatcher’s successors in the 2000s, representations of internalised rights-based movements of non-UK EU citizens became confused with externalised permission-based barriers to non-EU transnational movements of people. Non-UK EU citizens were stigmatised as harmful burdens to the welfare and healthcare resources of UK society and as abusers of the right of free movement within the EU. The internalised movement of EU citizens into the UK shifted from harmless to harmful definitions. Remarks by Blair, Brown and Cameron exemplified the ongoing neoliberalisation of UK society (a process that had been accelerated by Thatcher) through commodified representations of the movements of non-UK EU citizens. The reduction of non-UK EU citizens into commodified objects whose value was defined by contributions to the ‘economy’ as the primary social good was interconnected with tensions between cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and anti-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes (see Mack 2018). Commitments to the protection of national borders exclusive to the EU, unpinned the circulation of anti-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist attachments. Representations of the movements of non-UK EU citizens became entangled in the wider criminalisation of asylum seekers and unwanted ‘illegal immigrants’, which became distilled in the infamous ‘hostile environment’ immigration policy pursued by Cameron. More harmful risk

narratives about the movement of non-UK EU citizens into the UK were interwoven with wider societal fears about healthcare and welfare.

The article proceeds in two parts. The first part outlines the reductive relations implicit in the notion of a liberal paradox and presents a more active conceptualisation of fortification processes, which builds on long-standing accounts of language and power relations from the sociologies of Elias and Beck. The second part reconstructs the societal processes embedded in the representations of transnational migration by non-UK EU citizens articulated by UK Prime Ministers Blair, Brown, and Cameron.

The study contributes to ongoing discussions about EU integration and disintegration processes: in particular, in relation to how forms of language contribute to the identifying and emotionalising processes that continue to define and redefine the EU (Saurugger and Mérand 2010; Adler-Nissen 2014; Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2015, 156; Rosamond 2019; Coutto 2020; Ziegler 2020). Representations of non-UK EU citizens and the wider EU as a whole by Blair, Brown and Cameron mirrored the sentiments of contemporary populist movements. Their statements show the continuation of patterns noted by Husbands (1994: 192) through examples such as the Salman Rushdie affair in the UK, changes to political asylum in a newly reunified Germany, and debates about Muslim immigration in the Netherlands during 1991. In each of these examples, insecure concerns about national identifications commonly expressed by extreme right-wing groups become incorporated by more 'established' mainstream political parties (Husbands 1994: 202). In the first decade and a half of twentieth century, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), led most prominently by Nigel Farage, fused opposition to immigration and resistance to EU membership under the umbrella of more insecure collective-nationalist attachments (see John and Margarets 2009: 501; Ford and Goodwin 2014: 20–61; Dennison and Goodwin 2015: 168). Remarks by Blair (2003b) called for 'a Europe of Nations, not a federal super state, and that issues to do with taxation, foreign policy, defence policy, our own British borders will remain the prerogative of our national government and national Parliament'. Cameron (2015b) also envisaged the EU as '28 ancient nations' and noted 'that the answer to every problem is not always more Europe. Sometimes it is less Europe'. Their comments resembled the tone and substance of Matteo Salvini's vision of a Europe of the Nations (*Europa delle Nazioni*): a minimalist combative EU with limited institutional oversight premised on the defence and supremacy of national identifications, laws, and the protection of borders against immigration (Brunazzo and Gilbert 2017; La Mattina 2019; Heinisch et al. 2020: 9–11; Öner 2020).

Understanding fortification processes

As discussed in the previous section, the static polarisation inherent in the concept of a 'liberal paradox' between externalised economics and internalised notions of national domestic politics sustains the reproduction of a self-contained reductive model that preferences either economics or politics. There is the pressure to be more externalised societies through the fulfilment of humanitarian, economic and trade preferences that encompass more relaxed regulations on transnational movements of people. This is juxtaposed with internalised pressures of national domestic politics that enforce more stricter regulations on the transnational movement of people. Together, these divisions help maintain the separation of economics and politics as separate fields of professionalised expertise and academic research. Both Elias and Beck draw attention to the tendencies in the social sciences to reduce the development of human relations into isolated, static substances (Elias (2012b [1978]: 107; Beck 2006: 64). The use of the concept of a liberal paradox is process reductive, demonstrating little grasp of the long-term processes that have intertwined economics with politics. Economic and political orientations are falsely split from the wider sets of sociological relations and identifications that make up liberal-democratic societies. This is an implicitly thin account of societal power relations that are ahistorical (Horvath and Meeus 2016: 101). Lukács (1971 [1923]: 65–66) remarks that the de-politicisation of economics, and development of separate theories of economics, politics and society has formed part of societal power struggles, where, for example, 'the theory of the state' is positioned higher than societal antagonisms that makes the state into a seemingly neutral arbiter. These splits are also maintained by degrees of unawareness, where the 'progress' of techno-economic development 'becomes a substitute for questions, a type of consent in advance for goals and consequences that go unnamed and unknown' (Beck 1992: 184). The notion of a liberal paradox does not explain how the relations that form the contradiction are maintained over time. How certain groups of people become desired and/or undesired is dependent on the growth and perpetuation of national status groups based on class, ethnic and gender relations (Garapich 2008: 739; Mau et al. 2012: 2; Elrick and Winter 2018).

One way to move beyond the static liberal paradox model is to use a more active conceptualisation of fortification–defortification processes. Max Weber (1978: 1223–1225) discusses some of the historical instances where the development of fortified urban communities amalgamated military, economic, political

and ideological social power functions. The growth of towns and cities had a corresponding effect on the development of a fortified mindset. The 'idea of the city' as understood in early modern Europe developed around the notion of cities as enclosed, partitioned spaces with social and functional segregations, which facilitated easier population control and surveillance (Fraile 2010: 697). Paul Hirst (2005: 4–6) draws attention to the interconnections between spatial architecture and forms of social control through the examples of the Renaissance church, panoptical prison and artillery fortress. The historical development of towns and cities shows combinations of physical and socio-psychological boundaries that define the distinctions between people inside and outside specified spatial limits. The contemporary physical fortification of homes and businesses (see Low 2008; Landman 2012) and surveillance of public spaces (Coaffee 2004; Németh 2010) is interconnected with the growth of socio-psychological fortifications. Physical-spatial demarcations are interdependent with the how people raise, maintain and even lower the socio-psychological boundaries between themselves and others by establishing the fields of both assurance, and apprehension.

Fortification processes are part of the long-term socio-psychological processes of state-society formation and interlinked with changes in the we–I balance (Elias 2012a [1939]: 351–352; Elias 2007 [1987]: 19). One of the key themes in Elias's *On the Process of Civilisation* and Beck's *Risk Society* is how interdependencies bind both sociological and psychological balances between people (Elias 2012a [1939]: 485; Beck 1992: 100). How people socio-psychologically fortify and defortify their multi-layered we and I identifications can inform the ways in which their societies and they themselves maintain, extend and even lower the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. At the end of *Risk Society*, Beck (1992: 183–184) discusses the growth of a model of divided citizenship with differing accounts of societal change. There is the politico-economic *citoyen* notion of societal change through the fulfilment of democratic obligations alongside the techno-economic *bourgeois* justification of non-democratic change via industry, technology and business groups. In their study of the "Winston Parva" community, Elias and Scotson (2008 [1965]: 184) remark on how the experiences of industrialisation and urbanisation processes have prompted people into interdependent relationships with pre-existing groups. Members of older, more powerful established groups who are highly sensitive about their status quickly retreat into unchanging imageries of societal organisation and perceive the newcomers as risks to their authority.

In relation to the development of fortification processes, Elias (2012b [1978]: 24–25) remarks how

The ruling elites and many of their followers in each nation (or at least in each great power) imagine themselves to be in the centre of humanity as if in a fortress, contained and surrounded by all the other nations, yet at the same time cut off from them.

Beck (2002: 49) too notes the development of greater fortifications in state-societies via societal amalgams that practice a 'democratic authoritarianism'. This is where openness to global markets has paralleled 'a heightened fear of foreigners, born out of the apprehension of terrorism and bristling with the poison of racism'. Just as state-societies can fortify themselves, there is also the potential for defortification through changes in the we–I balance. Defortification processes encompass the shift towards the relative lowering of socio-emotive boundaries – the I-identifications that define 'insiders' from 'outsiders' – and the raising of we-identifications.

The EU is one example where fortification and defortification processes have occurred interdependently. The societal, political and economic expansion of the EU since the 1950s has been premised on what EU Chief Negotiator with the UK over Brexit Michel Barnier (2019) outlined as 'a positive political commitment. On contract rather than constraint. [...] to pool resources across the continent to define common European goods'. Barnier noted the growth of mutual we-identifications and forms of association through sets of shared socio-legal values that 'unites us as Europeans', which indicates a relative lowering of socio-psychological boundaries between national state-societies through the transgenerational institutionalised development of the EU. The 'common European goods' and projects he listed include the European Coal and Steel Community, common agricultural policy, cohesion policy, common market and the euro as currency. Barnier (2019) presented a shared narrative that recognises the changing power balances within the EU and global challenges such as climate change, which require collective actions 'where the nation state alone is not enough'. The institutionalised development of the EU demonstrates over time the gradual (but not total) defortification of EU societies, where national I-identifications synchronise with wider Europeanised we-identifications (for example, see the development of EU diplomacy Bátorá 2005; Spence 2009). The relative lowering of socio-emotive boundaries within EU societies has been paralleled by the consolidation of contested fortified boundaries beyond the EU, most notably in the Southern Mediterranean (see Ireland 1991; Kösebalaban 2007; Mandel 2013; Demmelhuber 2011; Neal 2009).

Language, leaders and power relations

One of the ways to understand the development of socio-psychological fortification processes is to refocus attention on the role of language and the ways in which power relations are performed through textual representations of societal relations. This is via the investigation of corpora of speeches, interviews and press conferences conducted by public officials (Jackson 2005: 2, 17). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and in particular the work of Norman Fairclough (2003; 2012; 2015), has emphasised the role of arguments as a window into power practices within and behind the utterances being articulated. CDA understands language as 'a socially conditioned process' (Fairclough 2015: 55–56) in which sections of society use arguments that propagate visualisations of societal relations that legitimise certain actions (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 104; see also Jessop 2003). Understanding the interconnections between language and power relations is a concern not only in the work of Elias (2012b [1978]), Pierre Bourdieu (1991), but also Michel Foucault (2002 [1969]: 121, 131), who drew attention to the structures and regulatory practices that manufacture texts.

Representations of transnational movements of people in the language of political leaders over a period of time offers one of many pathways to investigate and build understandings about the fortification–defortification processes within liberal democratic societies. This approach enables the long-term tracing of arcs of societal development that would be imperceptible in a study that focused only on a single leader or speech. In contrast to the public pronouncements of journalistic media, political leaders, such as presidents and prime ministers, are societal coordinators and functioning symbols of the wider sections of the society they represent. They repeatedly negotiate contradictory imperatives that encompass 'the need to prove their representativeness or the need to mobilize the greatest possible number of votes while at the same time asserting the irreducibility of their project to those of other leaders' (Bourdieu 1991: 246). The political speech of leaders 'constitutes a commitment to action' (Bourdieu 1991: 190) by leaders on behalf of their constituents. They are dependent on 'managed populism' through securing degrees of popularity within their political parties and throughout wider society (Rose 2001: 11). Leaders represent their constituents and propagate representations of societal relations. These visualisations inform how they occupy and practice their coordination role (see Elias 2012b [1978]: 140).

Depictions of transnational movements of people by political leaders who represent 'party-government establishments' offer an insight into the values and beliefs of wider more powerful established groups in society (Elias 2008 [1976]: 26). Their depictions of less-powerful transnational outsider groups propagate particular forms of power relations through representations in the form of gossip, which are bound to the idealisation of communal norms and relationships (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 122–133). The notion of gossip provided by Elias and Scotson (2008 [1965]: 122–136) gives a wider account of inter-group relations than just communal hearsay. 'One of the determinants of gossip is usually the degree of competition between the gossipers for the ear and attention of their followers, which in turn depends on competitive pressures – particularly the pressure of status rivalries' (Elias and Scotson (2008 [1965]: 127). At higher degrees of societal integration, under the competitive pressures of their coordination positions, alongside public pressure from sections of society such as journalistic media, political leaders can propagate gossip through labelling practices. Labels and sets of language that attach certain meanings to people can legitimise particular visions of societal relations across an open spectrum from personalised insult to authorised official labels (Bourdieu 1991: 239). Politicians and political leaders who manage relations on this higher level of social integration can often practice combinations of praise gossip of established groups – often those connected with political leaders themselves – and blame gossip towards outsider groups utilising forms of implicitly harmful stigma (Elias and Scotson (2008 [1965]: 122; also see van Benthem van den Bergh 1977). Over time, depictions of particular outsider groups can habituate forms of association and disassociation in the sense of de Swaan's (1995; 1997) understanding of circles of identification, disidentification and indifference.

Ambiguous depictions of transnational outsiders mobilise the tensions between what Elias (2013 [1989]: 169) calls the 'duality of normative codes within the nation state' and Beck (2006: 74) calls the dialectic of cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation movements. Political leaders can appeal to the humanist-egalitarian code that favours compassion to fellow individuals as the highest value (Elias (2013 [1989]: 169–170). The cosmopolitanisation movement is a vision of society that is receptive to multiple forms of association (Beck 2006: 9). In contrast, the collective-nationalist code prioritises compassion to fellow members of the state-society through idealised connections to a reservoir of nationalised symbols (Elias (2013 [1989]: 169–170). Where the cosmopolitans perceive relative harmlessness from transnational movements of people and advocate for the lowering of societal barriers, the anti-cosmopolitans interpret greater harmfulness to society in ways that proactively stigmatise transnational movements of people. This leads to the circulation of preventative measures in the form of new laws and standards aimed at raising societal barriers (Beck 2006: 115–117).

The language of political leaders disseminates a range of risk orientations about the transnational movement of people. There is the notion of ‘people as risks’ to the society they enter (Heyman 2013: 70). People risk orientations are part of longer socio-historical processes, where the development of ‘cheap transport and increased mobility over longer distances have made it still more common throughout the world for displaced groups to impinge on older established groups’ (Mennell 1998: 124). In centuries after c.AD1700 there has been a more rapid and widescale movement of people (Manning 2013: 136–137) – both voluntarily and involuntarily in comparison with previous periods – who have been variously classified as slaves, convicts, workers, refugees, accelerating the growth and expansion of nations and cities. In the societal relations of slave ownership, the movement of slaves was defined as a commercial risk (Crothers 2004: 626). Beck (1994: 16) notes that the development of industrial society ‘presupposes mobility and the readiness to be mobile’. The management of societal fears becomes an essential attribute of political leadership in contexts characterised by the development of global risk societies and power struggles surrounding ‘those who produce and profit from risks and the many who are afflicted with the same risks’ (Beck 1992: 76; 1999: 16). Leaders can position themselves as the architects of some transnational risks defined as harmless, and as the protectors from transnational risks categorised as harmful, which reveals the kinds of sub-state societal groups reliant on definitions of harmfulness/harmlessness (Beck 1999: 16; 2007: 692). Political leaders contribute to the definitions of harmful and harmless transnational movements of people.

In summary, the language of leaders offers a way of understanding the degrees of fortification and/or defortification present in liberal-democratic societies by focusing on how certain leaders mobilise tensions between cosmopolitan humanist-egalitarian and anti-cosmopolitan collective-nationalist normative codes. The oscillation between these codes can reveal the harmful and harmless risk orientations, both of which can circulate societal fears held by sections of established groups, situating relations with outsider groups.

The fortification of the UK in remarks by Blair, Brown and Cameron (2001–2016)

There are two historical processes that can help contextualise the representations of transnational movements by non-UK EU citizens articulated by UK Prime Ministers Blair, Brown and Cameron in the first decade and a half of the twenty first century. The first process is decolonialisation in the decades following the end of the Second World War. Late and post-imperial migration from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent contributed to the development of a style of multiculturalism that incorporated notions racial equality (Koopmans and Statham 1999: 693; Hansen 2000: 20). The Attlee Government’s reforms via the 1948 British Nationality Act sought to maintain the UK’s global status at the head of the Commonwealth through enabling the migration of individuals from the Empire and Commonwealth to the UK (Ashcroft and Bevir 2018: 5). Openness to transnational movements from current and former imperial colonies helped maintain lingering I-identifications towards powerful a UK at the centre of a global empire (Black 2018: 18).

However, openness to late and post-imperial migration shifted, as the reality of the UK’s diminished global status and consequences of post-war social and political changes began to take hold. Hansen (2000: 20, 26) notes that, by the 1960s, there was a bipartisan consensus that made ‘good race relations’ dependant on regulating numbers of migrant arrivals. The growing hostility to immigration is exemplified in Enoch Powell’s (1999 [1968]: 383–392) infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech given in Birmingham on 20 April 1968 that connected post-imperial migration with fears about communal violence and reduced access to public services. In the aftermath of the speech, Powell was sacked from the shadow cabinet of Conservative party opposition leader Edward Heath. However, Powell’s speech and the many letters of support he received afterwards represented a ‘broader emotional culture of postwar Britain’, where immigration became a conduit for feelings about uncompensated wartime sacrifices and post-war indignation about the scarcities of health and social housing provision (Schofield 2013: 8).

Of greater consequence was the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act passed by the Labour government of Harold Wilson on 1 March, a month before Powell’s speech. The 1968 act restricted entry into the UK by British overseas passport holders, which adversely affected the movement into the UK of Indians who were fleeing the discriminatory policies pursued by the Kenyan government led by Jomo Kenyatta (Hansen 1999: 810). This was followed by the 1971 Immigration Act under Heath’s premiership, which further restricted the rights of Commonwealth citizens to remain in the UK. ‘The unsuccessful attempt to secure the post-imperial Commonwealth vision immediately after the Second World War therefore created a political and legal legacy that intertwined race, citizenship and immigration with the search for “Britishness” after decolonisation’ (Ashcroft and Bevir 2018: 5–6). By the 2000s, the UK shifted from a post-imperial-orientated openness to transnational migration that attempted to cling onto the vestiges of empire to ‘one of the strictest migration policies in the Western world’ (Hansen 2000: 20, 26).

The second process is the Europeanisation of UK society. The term 'Europeanisation' is used here to stand in for what could more properly be termed 'EU-isation' (see Radaelli 2003: 27; Wallace 2006: x). The meaning of 'Europeanisation' is contested, and it is unlikely that there will ever be a single definition or single theory (Bache and Jordan 2006: 17; Graziano and Vink 2013: 39). Here, it is interpreted as the ongoing subnational, national and supranational integration processes that continue to make and remake the EU. The concept itself came out of debates in EU integration studies at the end of the 1990s following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Graziano and Vink 2013: 36). The treaty itself emerged as a collective response to the changing power balances in Europe, in light of events such as the end of the Cold War, German reunification, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The 1992 Maastricht treaty (succeeded by the 2007 Lisbon treaty) expanded EU institutional competencies in fields such as the economy via the creation of the euro and the European Central Bank, consumer protection, foreign affairs, asylum and immigration, policing (the creation of Europol), as well as a notion European citizenship where EU citizens could travel and live freely within any fellow EU member (Official Journal of the European Communities 1992). Unlike other international organisations, the national legal systems of EU member states are bound by international legal rules set out in the successive treaties and case law from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Adler-Nissen 2009: 128–130). EU-isation concerns the institutionalisation processes of 'formal and informal rules, procedures [...] "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms' that distinguishes how the EU functions, which are then integrated into the judgements, policies, structures, and identifications of member states (Radaelli 2003: 30). EU membership and corresponding we-identification shifts in accordance with the developmental spurts and counter-spurts of EU-isation processes.

From the initial unsuccessful attempt for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961 to eventual membership in 1973, UK politics and society became gradually Europeanised (Bache and Jordan 2006: 27). At the same time, the UK has consistently resisted moves towards more deeper EEC/EU integration: even in the early years of membership 'the UK quickly acquired a reputation for being awkward and uncooperative' (Gowland et al. 2010: 75; also see Thatcher 1988). EEC/EU membership meant acceptance of the four freedoms that encompassed free movement of people, capital, goods and services within its member states, as first set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. In order to 'to avoid a stalemate in treaty negotiations' the UK (and Denmark) managed to secure a set of opt-outs on the euro, the Schengen Area that abolished passport controls between EU members, and justice and home affairs (Adler-Nissen 2011: 1093–1095).

In the case of external migration and asylum policy, EU integration was understood 'as a potential solution to domestic political issues' (Geddes 2005: 737). There was a split between the internalised labour movements within the EU that served economic needs, and the externalised territorial boundaries that defined the UK and the EU with the management of non-EU movements of people (Geddes 2005: 725; Ette and Gerdes 2007: 104). European Council and Parliament Directive 2004/38/EC (hereafter ECP Directive 2004/38/EC) reaffirmed the right of free movement and residence by EU citizens, defined as 'any person having the nationality of a Member State'. This definition delineates an inclusive understanding of citizenship where citizens of any member state of the EU had the right to move, work and reside in UK, and UK citizens could do the same in fellow EU member states. The movement of non-UK EU citizens into the UK was a 'rights-based treaty framework', in contrast to the 'permission-based' regulation of non-EU movement (Dennison and Geddes 2018: 1139–1140). The distinction is crucial: a rights-based framework assumes more equal relations between established groups in the UK, and non-UK EU citizens, whereas a permission-based framework sets up more unequal relations between more powerful UK established groups and less powerful transnational outsider groups. This facilitates 'the right to discriminate between would-be immigrants on grounds of nationality, skill-level and family reunification status, amongst other criteria' (Dennison and Geddes 2018: 1140).

An analysis of the language of UK leaders in speeches made across the premierships of Blair, Brown and Cameron indicates the development of an increasingly hostile permission-based understanding of the movement of non-UK EU citizens to/within the UK in the decade and a half before the 2016 referendum on UK EU membership. This was a period inclusive of the 2004, 2007 and 2013 EU enlargements from 15 to 28 members. Hostility to non-UK movements of EU citizens was also expressed in UK print media over the same period. For example, during August–September 2001, tabloid media depicted the movements of asylum seekers via the Eurotunnel and Sangatte reception centre as an invasion of the UK (Schuster 2003: 511). To take another example, the ascension of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU in 2007 was depicted as a hostile invasion by the tabloid press (Light and Young 2009 228).

Turning back to the leaders' speeches, the data analysed in the rest of this section were sourced from the UK Government Web Archive accessed through the National Archives, alongside the British Political Speech online archive, which contains speeches made at annual political-party conferences. The relevant sections of each speech were identified using a keyword search of the words 'migration', 'migrant' and 'immigration'. UK

leaders were understood as moral propagators whose language helps substantiate the kinds of practices that become accepted as 'reasonable' actions. Their remarks contribute to public narratives that frame the circumstances for societal action (Jackson 2005: 2, 17).

Commodification of non-UK EU citizens and normative code tensions

Blair, Brown and Cameron propagated the attitudes of a financial establishment with higher power ratios in UK society. They valued the movement of financial capital, and understood the movements of non-UK EU citizens through the lens of a neoliberal ideology that saw financial contributions to the economy as the fundamental value in society (Harvey 2005: 2; Brown 2015: 10). As a mode of thought, neoliberalism is premised on the notion that 'human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade' (Harvey 2005: 2). The process of neoliberalisation 'seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market', which also means the reduction of protective state functions to areas such as defence, police and legal utilities that guarantee the functioning of markets, protection of private property and reliability of money (Harvey 2005: 2–3). The movement of non-UK EU citizens to the UK was commodified, with the citizens understood as moveable objects that served market transactions. Their value to UK society was determined by their perceived economic contribution. UK leaders reduced the movement of non-UK EU citizens into another tradable and – at its furthest extreme – a potentially expendable commodity.

Economic contributions defined the standards for the societal acceptance of non-UK EU citizens and limited we-identifications towards the EU. In 2004, before the largest EU enlargement to date, Blair (2004c; see also 2006b) remarked that people would not be allowed to

come to the UK from anywhere in the enlarged EU simply to claim benefits or housing. There will be no support for the economically inactive.

In the quotation above, Blair (2004c) externalised the internalised rights-based movements of EU citizens, whose ability to remain in the UK was dependent on their economic contributions. His comment shows very limited we-identifications towards the EU and makes it easy to perceive the UK as external to the EU, demonstrating degrees of indifference not only to the EU as an institution, but also towards UK membership within the EU.

the contribution to our economy of the eastern Europeans who came to Britain in the last few years – showing that in every year their net contribution was positive.

In common with Blair, Brown maintained an implicit dividing line between older and newer 'eastern European' members of the EU, who are defined by their inputs into 'our economy'. The 'our' presents an implicit separation between the UK national economy and the wider webs of economic integration binding the UK into the EU as a member state and part of the single market. At the time of Blair and Brown's remarks, there was no definite separation between the UK national economy and wider Europeanised movements of people, capital, goods and services. Their comments are examples of a more harmless risk characterisation of the movement of non-UK EU citizens; however, this is premised on a narrow criterion of economic contribution to the UK national economy.

Cameron (2011c) voiced more harmless risk characterisations of financially wealthy non-EU movements of people, the 'brightest and the best' with pre-existing status that brought high levels of financial capital into Britain. He promoted what have become known as 'golden visas', where those with £2m in UK bonds or shares could remain indefinitely in the UK (see Pegg 2017; and Home Office 2017 guidance for Tier 1 Investor Visas). One of the implications in his statements is the belief that financially wealthy non-EU newcomers are more societally attractive people.

In parallel, Cameron also railed against what he saw as excesses of immigration under Blair and Brown and expanded efforts to reduce the movement of EU citizens into the UK. Like his predecessors, Cameron (2014a) also externalised the internal movement of non-UK EU citizens:

So we can make an impact on European migration, and we need to. I think part of our problem has been, because our economy is now growing much faster than other European economies,

many people are coming from Europe to work in Britain, because their economies aren't creating jobs where our economy is creating jobs. So I think deal with the welfare tourism and we'll deal with some of the problem of EU migration (Cameron 2014a).

In his speech to the Conservative Party conference that year, he remarked that 'the bigger issue today is migration from within the EU' (Cameron 2014b). He reduced the movement of EU citizens moving to the UK into a 'problem' because they fulfilled their treaty rights. 'EU citizens moved in the context of a rights-based treaty framework and therefore were not "immigrants" in any legal sense' (Dennison and Geddes 2018: 1140). The notion of 'European migration' or 'EU migration' differentiates the movement of non-UK EU citizens from the wider reciprocal movements of people that constituted UK membership within the EU. Cameron's statement demonstrates an indifference towards the basic features of UK membership in the EU, in particular the right of EU citizens from member states to move freely within the boundaries of the EU. He portrays non-UK EU citizens as 'immigrants', which reflects a swing to more nationalist I-identifications exclusive to the rest of the EU.

The swing of normative code tensions to collective national attachments

In brief moments, Blair, Brown and Cameron demonstrated more humanist-egalitarian interpretations of the movements of non-UK EU citizens to the UK. Blair (2006a) noted that

we were one of the first, if not the only large country that when the new countries came into the European Union, like Slovakia [...]. When we first took the decision to open our markets to those people from central and Eastern Europe, many people worried that it would be bad for our economy. Actually it has been positive for our economy, because new people coming in have contributed dynamism and enterprise and actually hard work to our economy.

In the quote above, Blair expressed a commodified understanding of the movements of EU citizens from newer member states, where the main criterion for acceptance into UK society is their economic contributions to the UK national 'economy'. With these remarks, Blair (2006a) reduced constructive identifications towards the movement of non-UK EU citizens to the facilitation of market transactions.

Brown (2010b) like Blair maintained a degree of constructive openness to the movements of non-UK EU citizens. Again, this openness was limited to the perceived economic benefits for UK society. He mentioned that

around 1 million citizens of other EU countries are now living and working in Britain— but there are also around 1 million Britons living and working in the rest of the EU, making the most of the opportunities and new horizons that EU membership brings.

Brown gave a rare account of the reciprocal relations that constitute UK membership within the EU by beneficially speaking about the '1 million citizens of other EU countries'. By mentioning 'the opportunities and new horizons' of EU membership, his comment shows degrees of both nationalised I-identifications and Europeanised we-identifications.

In contrast to the more constructive understanding of the transnational movements by non-UK EU citizens expressed by Blair and Brown, Cameron (2016b) remarked that

Many British people take advantage of free movement to go and live and work in other European countries. But I think where this has gone wrong is that the interaction of our welfare system with free movement has actually set up very large pressures on our country, and that is what needs to change.

In the quote above, Cameron (2016b) reduced non-UK EU citizens into 'pressures' on 'our welfare system'. In his eyes, the notion of free movement is something for UK citizens 'to take advantage of', but implicitly this benefit did not extend to citizens from fellow EU members moving to the UK – even though UK citizens were EU citizens at this point in time. The quote expresses attachments to UK nationalist I-identifications that

excludes Europeanised we-identifications, in the form of an exclusive transactional account of societal relations that separates UK citizens from fellow EU citizens.

The tone of Blair, Brown and Cameron's openness to movements of non-UK EU citizens was almost always defensive. They often reiterated the UK's opt-out from the Schengen Area (Blair 2004b; 2004e; 2006b; Brown 2007a; Cameron 2011b; 2013b; 2016a). Cameron (2011a; 2015b) in particular, portrayed the Schengen Area as a zone of weakness, which made, in his eyes, fellow EU members vulnerable to a 'wave' of harmful transnational movement. In response to a question from the media about what would later become Lisbon Treaty, Blair (2004e) made an exclusive juxtaposition between nationalised UK border rules and Europeanised borders, even though the external borders of the UK were shared with the EU:

There is no question of Britain giving up our veto on our border controls. In the Treaty of Amsterdam 7 years ago we secured the absolute right to opt-in to any of the asylum and immigration provisions that we wanted to in Europe. Unless we opt in, we are not affected by it. And what this actually gives us is the best of both worlds. We are not obliged to have any of the European rules here, but where we decide in a particular area.

In the context of negotiations surrounding the Lisbon Treaty, Brown (2007a) spoke about securing 'safeguards' to UK exceptions to the Schengen Area, as well as justice and home affairs sections:

we have secured in detail vital safeguards to our criminal law system and police and judicial processes, while making it possible to cooperate across borders when we choose to do so when it is right in matters vital to our security.

The very notion of 'safeguards' presumed a more negative account of EU integration as something to be protected against. Cameron (2011c) spoke of

the sense out there is that mass migration is inevitable in a globalised society and a modern economy and, as a result, it's just all too difficult for one country to control its own borders. Added to that, with migration from the EU to worry about as well.

He voiced collective nationalist concerns about the protection of borders that made the movement of EU citizens to the UK into a 'worry'. The movements of non-UK EU citizens who realised their treaty rights became externalised into another difficulty of global 'mass migration', and an additional form of non-EU people movement. The phrase 'migration from the EU' promoted the notion that the UK was separate from the EU, despite being an EU member at the time.

The language of Blair, Brown and Cameron demonstrates a swing to more collective set of nationalist I-identifications, cultivating an indifference about the treaties and reciprocal obligations of EU membership. They show a greater interest in the collective-nationalist preservation of internal passport and border controls with fellow EU member states over any deeper degrees of cooperation.

Criminalisation, stigmatisation and resistance to EU integration

Blair, Brown and Cameron characterised the movement of non-UK EU citizens to the UK as more harmful risks to UK society. The thinking behind the wider criminalisation of asylum seekers as harmful non-EU movement by UK leaders was expanded to include the reduction of movements by EU citizens into the UK, which set the scene for resistance to the movement of non-UK EU citizens to the UK to become resistance to EU institutions as a whole. Daddow (2011: 221–229) has highlighted that Blair and Brown were never fully committed to the notion of ever-closer union as understood by fellow EU members. They were unable to recognise the development of the EU's 'late sovereign diplomacy', where nationalised I-identifications were integrated into broader Europeanised we-identifications with the supranational institutions of the EU (Adler-Nissen 2009: 122). The statements by UK leaders demonstrate a blurring of the distinctions between the rights-based movement of non-UK EU citizens, and permission-based movements of people from states outside the EU.

the direct benefit [of a national identity system] in making the nation's borders more secure. We can be clear who is here, we can improve the integrity of our asylum system, we can reduce illegal immigration and disrupt terrorist activity and of course it gives us better access to services.

Blair (2006b) stressed collective-nationalist needs to 'make the nation's borders more secure', which presumed sufficient degrees of societal vulnerability that prompted greater means to distinguish between legal and 'illegal' forms of transnational movement. He stigmatised and equated unwanted 'illegal immigration' with concerns about transnational violence via mentions of 'terrorist activity'. Brown (2009) echoed the same collective nationalist sentiments in relation to the protection of national borders 'against illegal immigration' by stating his

continued commitment to strong borders, and the rigorous enforcement of the laws against illegal immigration. [...] [I]t's a system which is positive about managed and controlled migration while ensuring that it serves the national interest.

In his 2011 immigration speech, Cameron (2011c) expressed his desire

to do much better on the final group I want to talk about today, which is illegal immigration. We've got to be much better at finding these people and getting them out of our country [...]. I want everyone in the country to help with this, including by reporting suspected illegal immigrants to our Border Agency through the Crimestoppers phone line or the Border Agency website. Together I do believe we can reclaim our borders and send illegal immigrants home.

His remark warned UK society about the presence of 'illegal immigrants' within the community. He also made the misleading assertion that control over national borders had been lost, through the phrase 'reclaim our borders'. In common with his predecessors, Cameron's language propagates a harmful risk narrative concerning 'illegal immigrants' by stressing collective-nationalist attachments to national borders, then mobilising public support in favour of his crusade to find and expel unwanted transnational movement.

The remarks of Blair, Brown and Cameron reflect what Wacquant (1999: 219) calls the 'criminalisation of immigrants', which prompts targeted groups to develop more covert methods of evading state-societal regulation, which in turn draws more attention from law enforcement. In the following statement, Brown (2008a) expanded the criminalisation of immigrants (non-EU movements of people) to encompass non-UK EU citizens:

Where the rules allow us to limit migration within the EU, we will also use them where appropriate – as we have imposed restrictions on migrants from Romania and Bulgaria, in particular their access to our labour market. And we will make sure that where EU citizens do come to Britain they are exercising not an open-ended right but their treaty right which is a right to work – we are able to remove EU citizens if they come here but are not employed after three months or are not studying or self-sufficient. I believe that European Member States should work together to ensure EU migration works to the benefit of all and that EU migrants contribute fully to our society. The British Government will review access to benefits for EU migrants, and what more can be done to disincentivise and punish criminality.

In the above quotation, non-UK EU migrants (particularly those from Romania and Bulgaria) were accepted only so far as they fulfil their 'treaty right', but should they become unemployed, not in education, and/or engaged in criminal activity, they could be deported. This is an example of what Elias and Scotson (2008 [1965]: 115) have called the 'minority of the worst' stigma, where the actions of a minority section of a group of people is used to denigrate the practices of the majority.

ECP Directive 2004/38/EC does mention the measures to expel EU citizens from a member state for reasons of 'public policy' or 'public security'; however, it notes that this is 'a measure that can seriously harm persons who, having availed themselves of the rights and freedoms conferred on them by the Treaty, have become genuinely integrated into the host Member State'. Expulsion procedures should 'be limited in accordance with the principle of proportionality to take account of the degree of integration of the persons concerned'. Implicit in ECP Directive 2004/38/EC is an inclusive understanding of EU citizenship that merges nationalised I-identifications with Europeanised we-identifications. It also recognises and tries to balance the power

relations between EU citizens and EU member state-societies. ECP Directive 2004/38/EC tries to negotiate both cosmopolitan humanist-egalitarian commitments to the protection of individual EU citizens and anti-cosmopolitan collective-nationalist responsibilities to state-societies. In contrast, the remarks by UK leaders articulate a more exclusive notion of citizenship that prioritised nationalised I-identifications over Europeanised we-identifications. There is a more unequal power balance that prioritises protection of UK society over the citizens of fellow EU member states.

The externalisation of the movements by non-UK EU citizens into the UK was hastened by the pursuit of the now infamous net migration target. In 2011, Cameron (2011c) pledged to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands and to cap all forms of immigration into the UK. He called for

real limits, proper enforcement, real control over how many people come here and who they are. And if we take the steps set out today and deal with all the different avenues of migration – legal and illegal – then levels of immigration can return to where they were in the 1980s and 1990s, a time when immigration was not a front-ranked political issue. And I believe that will mean that net migration to this country will be in the order of tens of thousands each year, not the hundreds of thousands every year that we've seen over the last decade.

The notion of net migration objectified all forms of transnational movement into the UK including the movements of EU citizens into a politico-administrative calculation. The movement of non-UK EU citizens into the UK became entangled into the 'hostile environment' immigration policy that ensnared people who moved to UK as children in the 1950s and the 1960s (Consterdine 2018; Warren 2018; Gentleman 2018). Cameron's net migration pledge accelerated a pattern of disidentification that stigmatised the movement of non-UK EU citizens into the UK. This was preceded by Blair's (2007) infamous 'tipping point' assertion about the reducing the number of claims lodged by asylum seekers:

take immigration and asylum, as a result of the reforms that have been made, we used to only remove one in five failed asylum claimants. We now for the last year, 2006, for the first time in the Immigration Department's history have got a tipping point where we are removing more people than we are taking in, in unfounded claims.

The quantified pursuit of reducing numbers of asylum seekers by Blair (2007) shows a pattern of orientation that understands the transnational movement of people as commodified market transactions that can be raised and lowered. Mulvey (2010: 445) notes that 'government framing of asylum as a numerical crisis and threat, aided by the media, not only contributed to that crisis but also implied the solution, a reduction in numbers'. Statements by Blair (2007) and Brown (2010a) reduce any wider understanding of transnational movements of people into exclusive numerical either/or conceptualisations:

Some people talk as if net inward migration is rising. In fact, it is falling – down from 237,000 in 2007, to 163,000 in 2008, to provisional figures of 147,000 last year. Some people talk as if all immigrants stay here forever. In fact, most come for short periods and then return to their own country. And last year alone, over 100,000 Eastern Europeans left Britain to go home. Our new points system is radically changing the way we are dealing with immigration from outside the European Union.

In common with Cameron (2011c, cited earlier), Brown (2010a) in the account above spoke about sending unwanted 'immigrants' 'home'. Although he specified that he was referring to transnational movements of people from 'outside the European Union', his use of terms such as 'net inward migration' distorts the distinctions between the rights-based movement of EU citizens and permission-based non-EU movements of people. Both Brown (2010a) and Cameron (2011c) committed what Beck (2006: 25) calls the 'prison error of identity', which determines that 'each human being has one native country, which he/she cannot choose; he is born into it and it conforms to the either/or logic of nations and the associated stereotypes'. The language of UK leaders articulates an exclusive notion of national citizenship and residence. They tacitly assume that non-UK EU citizens can only ever be full members of their country of birth. They also contradict the inclusive understanding of EU citizenship in European ECP Directive 2004/38/EC and the Lisbon Treaty (Official Journal of the European Union (2007). In this respect, Cameron (2014c) spoke of

our action to cut migration from outside the EU has not been enough to meet our target of cutting the overall numbers to the tens of thousands. The figures yesterday demonstrate that again. As we've reduced the numbers coming to the UK from outside the European Union, the numbers from inside the European Union have risen.

In the above quotation, the movement of EU citizens into the UK was reduced into a numerical target. Cameron (2014c) distorts the distinctions between the movement of EU citizens and non-EU movements of people. The remark also disseminates indifference towards both the citizens of fellow EU member states, and the wider treaties that constituted UK membership in the EU.

Antagonism against movements of non-UK EU citizens into the UK formed part of the wider context of UK national resistance to supranational EU institutionalisation. In Adler-Nissen's (2011: 1093, 1099–1100) study of public officials posted to Brussels, she argues that the UK opt-outs demonstrate how the EU has managed to pursue 'a particular form of differentiated integration', a tighter we-identification that is also mutually responsive with national priorities. In the language of UK prime ministers, reference to the UK's opt-outs were bound to nationalised I-identifications exclusive to Europeanised we-identifications. The mutual I- and we-identifications that bound the orientations of the public officials in Adler-Nissen's study were not present in the language of Blair, Brown and Cameron. Blair (2003b; 2004d; 2005) inconsistently critiqued 'narrow nationalism' yet reaffirmed the Schengen opt-out and opposed any sharing of reciprocal functions such as taxation, foreign and defence policy and border controls.

Relations with EU institutions were limited to narrow, selective cooperation on 'terrorism, illegal immigration and organised crime' (Brown 2007b; Blair 2002; Blair 2004a). Blair (2004e) expressed exclusive nationalist understandings of UK society:

we are an island nation, we insisted that we would retain complete control over our own borders, and would only participate in European-wide action where we chose to do so, in other words stronger than an opt-out, an opt-in.

In the quote above, the notion of 'island nation' shifts a geographical distinction into a socio-political division between the UK on one side of the North Sea and English Channel, and the EU on the other side (with the exception of Ireland). This mode of thinking implicitly separates the UK from the wider EU.

In the context of the 2015 Mediterranean migration crisis, Cameron (2015b) remarked that

the war in Syria has unleashed a wave of migration towards Europe which we see night after night on our television screens. Britain has never joined the Schengen border-free zone, so we retain our border controls. This, and our geographical status as an island, means we are less directly affected than other European countries by this crisis.

Like Blair (2004e), Cameron (2015b) turned geography into political sociology through the UK's 'geographical status as an island' that becomes a protective barrier against a 'a wave of migration towards Europe'. He also subliminally assumed that the Schengen Area made EU societies vulnerable to harmful transnational movements of people from Syria, and reaffirmed protective 'border controls' of the UK's opt-out.

The differentiation of the UK from wider EU integration and cooperation turned towards greater suspicion about EU institutionalisation and the free movement of EU citizens. Brown (2008b) declared that

free movement cannot be an unfettered right. It must bring with it clear responsibilities - with failure to meet them carrying clear consequences including, where appropriate, the loss of that right entirely [...] considerable support across member states and agreement to look further at the responsibilities associated with free movement where crimes are committed by EU residents in the EU but outside their country of origin.

Here, Brown undermines the principle of free movement within the EU, and the protective functions of ECP Directive 2004/38/EC. He instead focuses on expanding the coercive functions that facilitate the expulsion of EU citizens who commit crimes in the UK. This mirrors a pattern noted Geddes (2005: 734) where the UK has opted into coercive procedures within EU asylum policy and management of non-EU movements of people, and opted out of protective procedures on family reunion and rights of long-term residents in an EU member state.

Cameron (2015b) expressed suspicions about the ECJ verbalised UK perceptions of inferiority 'that it is easier for an EU citizen to bring a non-EU spouse to Britain than it is for a British citizen to do the same'. He also spoke about the need for

stronger powers to deport criminals and stop them coming back, as well as preventing entry in the first place. And it means addressing ECJ judgments that have widened the scope of free movement in a way that has made it more difficult to tackle this kind of abuse. But ultimately, if we are going to reduce the numbers coming here we need action that gives greater control of migration from the EU.

The implication of Cameron's suspicions about familial reunions was that non-UK EU citizens are more privileged, should they, for example, have a non-EU spouse. Cameron (2015b) and Brown (2008b) propagated the notion that EU regulations on free movement are being abused by 'criminals', which demands the seizure of greater national powers from EU institutions such as the ECJ. Cameron (2015a; 2016c) further expanded his hostility to EU institutionalisation through four outs:

Out of the open borders. Out of the bailouts. Out of the euro. And out of all those schemes in which Britain wants no part.

Each of these outs illustrates collective-nationalist attachments to an independent UK, with the pound as currency, governed and demarcated by national laws and borders. Cameron concentrates on the differences between the UK and the EU with no common interwoven narrative.

Health and welfare stigmatisations

Over time, the criminalisation and objectification of non-UK EU citizens as harmful risks to UK society amalgamated with wider societal concerns about access to social welfare and healthcare (Blair 2004c; 2006b; Cameron 2013a; 2014a; 2016c). Cameron (2015b) expressed the misleading remark that 'around 40 percent of all recent European Economic Area (EEA) migrants are supported by the UK benefits system'. The implication of this statement is that if EU citizens are not economically productive, then they become expendable liabilities. Cameron's comment is inconsistent with an analysis of Department of Work and Pensions data undertaken by Sumption and Altorjai (2016: 2). Their research found that 'roughly 10-20% of recently arrived EU adults were receiving tax credits in early 2014'. They also note that the 40 percent figure quoted by Cameron (2015b) 'counts as benefits recipients [sic] children living in households where at least one adult is receiving benefits, as well as the partners of both in- and out-of-work benefits recipients' (Sumption and Altorjai 2016: 11). Cameron's selective use of data implicitly assumes that the children of EU citizens receiving state assistance should be contributing to the UK economy. Furthermore, Dustmann and Frattini's (2014: F595) analysis of the fiscal impacts of transnational movements of people from the European Economic Area (EEA) since 2000 note that UK taxpayers were saved 'about £18 billion'. EEA movements of people also added 'to 'pure' public goods, about £82 billion between 1995 and 2011' (Dustmann and Frattini's (2014: F595).

Cameron's (2016b) claims about the 'interaction of our welfare system with free movement' reflects what Andersen and Bjørklund (1990: 212; also see Bjerkem 2016) in their study of the right-wing populist Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway in the early 1990s have called 'welfare state chauvinism'. This term refers to the belief that 'the welfare services should be restricted to "our own"' (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990: 212). Cameron's comments reflect what Slater (2014: 960) calls the myth of a 'Broken Britain' that contributes to 'manufacturing ignorance' about any alternative forms of poverty and social injustice measures. Cameron's welfare chauvinism towards the movements of non-UK EU citizens has contributed to the cultivation of greater ignorance of the actual, constructive fiscal impacts of their movement into the UK. Cameron demonstrates an inconsistency with his own neoliberal values by ignoring the fiscal contributions of non-UK EU citizens to UK society.

What we have is a free national health service, not a free international health service. So, let me put it very simply: we're going to get much better at proper reciprocal charging. Wherever we can claim back the cost of NHS care, we will. If someone visiting the UK from another EEA country uses our NHS, then it is right that they or their government pay for it. British taxpayers should support British families and those who contribute to our economy (Cameron 2013a).

For Cameron, the 'cost' of healthcare of other EU states residing in the UK should be shouldered by their country of origin and 'who contribute to our economy'. As per Dustmann and Frattini's (2014: F595) study, citizens of other EU member states living in the UK constructively added value to the UK economy. Cameron's comments came at the time when the National Health Service (NHS) showed signs of escalating strain during his premiership, through ongoing funding cuts and 'efficiency' savings, as well as events such as the junior doctors' strike of 2016 (BMA 2016; Horton 2017). Health stigmatisations twist societal reflections away from understanding the ongoing contribution of EU doctors and nurses to the NHS (O'Dowd 2017). In this context, non-UK EU citizens can be interpreted as convenient socio-political scapegoats for wider fears about the condition of health and welfare institutions in UK society.

Conclusion

In the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, UK prime ministers disseminated misleading depictions of the movements by citizens of other EU member states into the UK that contributed to the development of more reductive disassociations between the UK and the wider EU. Neighbours were twisted against neighbours through the externalisation of the internal treaty-bound movements of EU citizens to work and reside in another member state, and indifference towards the reciprocal obligations that bound UK membership in the EU. The very notion of 'EU migration' distorted the distinctions between rights-based internal movements of EU citizens and permission based external non-EU movements of people. During the final months of the 2016 EU Referendum campaign, with the Leave campaign ahead in the polls, one of Cameron's former advisors remarked that 'I can't believe people are really going to vote themselves poorer because they don't like the Poles living next door' (McTague, Spence and Dovey 2016).

Statements made by Blair, Brown and Cameron offered reasons for people to turn against their fellow EU citizens. Comments by Blair (2004c) that declared 'no support for the economically inactive' EU citizens living in the UK and by Cameron (2014a) that emphasised measures to manage 'the problem of EU migration' commodified the movement of non-UK EU citizens into a narrow focus on their economic contributions. Efforts to 'review access to benefits for EU migrants, and what more can be done to disincentivise and punish criminality' (Brown 2008a) criminalised the movement of EU citizens into the UK and opened a wider space of disidentification to contemplate more coercive measures to deport unwanted non-UK EU citizens. Cameron (2015b) desired 'stronger powers to deport criminals' that abused their free movement rights. The movements of non-UK EU citizens became part of a campaign to lower net migration to the 'tens of thousands' each year (Cameron 2011c). They became stigmatised as burdens on 'our welfare system' (Cameron 2016b) and drains on the UK's health system that 'their government [should] pay for' (Cameron 2013a).

Figures released by the Home Office (2018) noted a short-term spike of hate crime in England and Wales directed against non-UK EU citizens following the 2016 EU referendum. Following the referendum result and subsequent Brexit negotiations, EU citizens have needed to apply for Settled Status to maintain their residency in the UK. In a survey of 3,171 valid responses, many EU citizens wishing to remain in the UK said they felt 'angry', 'anxious' and 'unwanted' when asked 'to identify only one word to describe how having to apply for Settled Status, or the idea of it in the case of those who have not (yet) applied, made them feel' (Buelmann 2019: 29). Those responses exemplify how the statements by UK leaders have become sociologically integrated into the wider functions of the UK government and psychologically internalised into the outlooks of EU citizens themselves who reside in the UK. Where once they felt at ease, and could make a home in the UK, those options are now increasingly more precarious.

Representations of the movements of non-UK EU citizens into the UK articulated by UK prime ministers have shown the forms of socio-psychological fortification that maintained and expanded the boundaries between UK society and fellow EU member states. The persistent prioritisation of UK nationalist I-identifications over any form of Europeanised we-identifications occurred during a time when the UK was still a member of the EU. UK leaders propagated more fortified socio-psychological orientations through more harmful depictions of the movements by EU citizens into the UK that contributed to the greater disidentification of UK society from wider EU societies and disassociation from EU citizens themselves. UK citizens could 'take advantage of free movement rights (Cameron 2016b), yet for EU citizens in the UK there needed to be 'clear consequences including, where appropriate, the loss of that right entirely' should they abuse their treaty rights (Brown 2008b).

Harmful depictions of the movements of EU citizens into the UK assisted resistance to EU integration processes. Opt-outs to the Schengen Area emphasised the differentiation of the UK from EU. 'There is no question of Britain giving up our veto on our border controls [...]. We are not obliged to have any of the European rules here, but where we decide in a particular area' (Blair 2004e). The opt-outs also stressed the

protection of the UK from ‘a wave of migration towards Europe which we see night after night on our television screens. Britain has never joined the Schengen border-free zone, so we retain our border controls’ (Cameron 2015b). Anachronistic geographic notions of the UK as ‘an island nation’ (Blair 2004e) easily twisted into socio-political separations that required a review of the ‘responsibilities associated with free movement where crimes are committed by EU residents in the EU but outside their country of origin’ (Brown 2008b). The perceived misuse of free movement rights intensified suspicion of EU institutions, which necessitated ‘addressing ECJ judgments that have widened the scope of free movement in a way that has made it more difficult to tackle this kind of abuse’ (Cameron 2015b). Over a period of time, the language of successive UK prime ministers cultivated an ignorance of the treaties and ongoing reciprocal relations that bound the UK with the EU. It is an example of the ongoing need in the EU for common narratives to bind firmer we-identifications to encompass nationalist I-identifications.

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Notes

1. The common themes linking Elias's process with Beck's risk sociology are further discussed in Mack (2021).[⚡] [#N1-ptri]